An axis of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea might be forming; for Iran and North Korea, it is Washington’s fault.

The foreign policy commentariat feels like 2002 again. Countless pundits have resurrected in the last months the ‘Axis of Evil,’ the W. Bush administration’s preferred way of referring to Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. Some prefer to it the fancier ‘Axis of Upheaval.’ A more innovative acronym, the CRINK, which stands for China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, has also been gaining traction. Whatever the precise wording, many commentators see a bloc of Beijing, Moscow, Pyongyang, and Tehran conspiring to overpower the United States and destroy liberty in the world.

The term ‘Axis’ is historically loaded. Those uttering it hope to invoke the memory of the World War II alliance of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan. The Axis rhetoric aims to associate in the reader’s mind the CRINK countries with the infamy of the Nazis and their murderous allies. If a new Axis is on the rise, the reader should conclude that the Free World should go out of its way to defeat it by all means necessary. Diplomatic engagement with such aggressive, dangerous regimes is simply impossible.

However, is this recent return to Bushian rhetoric helpful in understanding the current predicaments of U.S. foreign policy and its allies?

First, a definition is in order. ‘Axis’ means more than mere diplomatic cooperation or occasional common positions. It suggests a strong political and military alignment between each member of the axis in order to achieve a common goal. Hence, talking of an axis encompassing China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea implies that the four form a cohesive alliance that shares the same goals of revising the international order and weakening the United States and its partners. Do the four countries form a tight bloc? Do they share the same goals?

Russia is the only one of the four to enjoy close security cooperation and coordination with all. Moscow’s relationship with China is arguably the strongest in the ‘axis,’ both in quality and importance. Sino-Russian relations normalized during the 1990s. The Soviet Union’s formidable armies no longer threatened northern China, and both wanted to leverage their improving relations to increase their margin of maneuver in the now U.S.-led world order. The 2000s saw normalization turn into alignment, pushed by the Bush Administration’s more confrontational approach, the two powers’ quest for support for their growing international ambitions, and the expectation of economic gain.

Sino-Russian coordination to break U.S. superiority and overturn the balance of power became more apparent during the 2010s. The number and intensity of joint military exercises grew quickly, and the two powers increasingly coordinated their diplomatic positions on issues of common interest. China failed to condemn the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and maintained its economic relations with Russia despite Western sanctions. Beijing appears increasingly comfortable supporting Moscow. It has even begun sending dual-use equipment to Russian forces. Meanwhile, Moscow has provided technical support unseen before, for instance, helping China modernize its early warning system, a key element to muster a strong nuclear deterrent.

While Russia’s relationship with China has developed into a significant alignment, its ties with North Korea reveal a more transactional dynamic. Still, Russia’s relationship with the DPRK is the only one that can compare with the depth of Moscow’s relationship with Beijing. Direct exchanges between Moscow and Pyongyang remained limited during the 2000s and 2010s. Worsening competition with the West during the late 2010s and early 2020s gave a new incentive for Moscow to pursue close ties with Pyongyang. A turning point was Russia’s war on Ukraine. The Kremlin needed to secure ammunition and weapons to resupply its forces, something that Pyongyang had no shortage of. The two became treaty allies in June 2024, and North Korean soldiers have joined Russian forces’ ranks in Ukraine.

But this alliance remains one-sided. North Korea acts to obtain from Russia cash, raw materials, technologies, and combat experience for its troops. Meanwhile, Moscow needs the DPRK’s help only for waging its war in Ukraine. Once the war ends, Pyongyang will have little to offer. Despite the 2024 mutual defense treaty, Russia remains primarily focused on competing with NATO in Europe and has finite resources. It benefits from a friendly North Korea, but the Korean Peninsula is of no vital interest. Therefore, it is hard to imagine a scenario where Russian soldiers would die to defend the DPRK if it were to get into trouble.

Relations between Iran and Russia are amicable. Moscow has played a key role in alleviating the impact of international sanctions on the Iranian economy. The two worked together to prop up the Assad regime. While Russia used to be the weapon supplier, it is now receiving weapons from Iran to support its war effort in Ukraine. Yet, the relationship is fraught with mistrust. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin saw worryingly Iranian attempts to build up influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Russia has also been careful not to antagonize the Arab world by supporting Iranian positions too overtly, thus limiting the scope of the relationship. Meanwhile, Iran resents Russia’s tendency to play all sides in the Middle East. Furthermore, Tehran spent billions of dollars and lost numerous fighters to defend the Assad regime, only to see Damascus fall under Russian influence.

Therefore, neither Russia nor Iran wishes the other to grow too much in power. A strong Iran would want to expand its influence in the Kremlin’s ‘near abroad.’ A more potent Russia would try to secure new positions throughout the Middle East, mechanically reducing Iran’s sway. Had it not been for American pressure on Iran, Tehran-Moscow ties would have been far shallower than they are now.

China and Iran have strong economic relations, as China is a key consumer of Iranian oil, and Beijing helped Tehran evade sanctions. It also participated in joint naval drills with Iran and Russia on several occasions. Although China is providing Iran with dual-use technologies, Tehran does not appear eager to import Chinese weapons and prefers local and Russian providers. Indeed, Iran has limited trust in China, too. Beijing wants to grow its influence in the Persian Gulf and the Arab world and tries to keep its distance from Iran’s regional endeavors. Hence, relations are good but far from representing an axis.

Relations between China and North Korea are arguably the worst among the quartet. The DPRK deeply fears its overbearing giant neighbor and wants to maintain its independence. Meanwhile, China dislikes that Pyongyang does not coordinate its foreign policy with Beijing. The Chinese also understand North Korea constantly seeks alternative partners to reduce its dependence on China. During the 2018 Kim Jong Un-Donald Trump rapprochement, many in Beijing feared that Pyongyang would shift sides to align with the United States. More recently, China merely tolerated the Russia-DPRK relations because it has a vested interest in seeing Russia victorious in Ukraine. It is not some kind of trilateral joint coordination, and China and North Korea exchange little when it comes to security and defense.

Relations between Iran and the DPRK are very cordial, including occasional arms sales and military exchanges, but there is no evidence of close coordination ongoing between the two. If one were to get into serious trouble, it appears unlikely that the other would jump to the rescue. It is hard to imagine, for instance, Tehran starting a major conflict in the Middle East to rescue Pyongyang from a losing war on the Korean Peninsula. Neither has much stake in the well-being of the other.

Another issue is that the CRINK states have very different objectives. China and Russia are in a league of their own. They are potential regional hegemons: great powers strong enough to contest the current security architecture in their neighborhood. Both wish to dominate their home region, expand their borders, and dismantle the U.S.-centered alliance systems that constrain them. They have large revisionist ambitions and the might to push them. China wants to reorder its regional neighborhood and may even hope to displace the United States as the number one world power. Russia is currently trying to conquer Ukraine and has expressed a willingness to push back NATO to its borders of 1991.

Meanwhile, Iran and North Korea have far more limited means and ambitions. Iran maintains an influence throughout the Middle East through allies like Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi militias, and it has notoriously poor relations with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Yet, there is no trace of Iran seriously envisioning overturning the regional order or conquering its neighbors. It may or may not develop nuclear weapons in the near future, but its conventional armed forces are too decrepit to threaten the survival of key partners of the United States.

Among Korea watchers, the DPRK’s intentions are a longstanding issue of contention. For some, Pyongyang cannot accept the division of the Korean Peninsula and will try at the first opportunity to seize control of the South. To others, it has mostly accepted the current status quo, and its focus is on defending its sovereignty and integrity. In any case, North Korea’s ambitions are centered on the Peninsula. Like Iran, it has neither the means nor the intentions to reshape East Asia or build a different world order. It remains, after all, an underdeveloped small country of 26 million souls, and its military, although massive, requires a complete overhaul.

This discussion is not a mere criticism of a poor choice of words. It matters because misdiagnosis leads to mistreatment. Following the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration convinced itself that Iraq was part of an axis of would-be terrorist pariah countries and invaded it in 2003. Many then saw the truth for what it was. Although Iran and North Korea harbor unsavory authoritarian regimes that sometimes foster instability, no grand alliance conspiring to take down Washington ever existed.

But the harm was done. The invasion of Iraq further convinced Tehran and Pyongyang that they needed nuclear weapons to survive Washington’s regime change spree. It also convinced China and Russia to accelerate their efforts to rebuild their power and befriend each other as a guarantee against American interventionism. The Axis rhetoric directly harmed the United States itself, as the nation lost thousands of soldiers and expanded fabulous amounts of taxpayer money to defeat an imaginary threat. In other words, it is reckless behavior from the West, and primarily the United States, that gives its consistency to an ‘Axis’ that has none.

China and Russia are both great powers that at least hope to reshape their neighborhood. Their designs are fundamentally hostile to the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia, as success for Beijing and Moscow would entail dominating most of the two continents. However, Iran and North Korea should be approached differently. Although these two may want to revise some specific elements of the international order they perceive as harmful, they lack the level of ambition and dangerousness of China and Russia. In other words, meaningful engagement with Pyongyang and Tehran remains possible, as the two are not threats of the magnitude of the great power competitors.

Therefore, a more productive approach would be proactively repairing relations between the United States, Iran, and North Korea. Indeed, had the Trump administration not broken the 2015 agreement to freeze the Iranian nuclear program, it is likely that Tehran would have pursued closer economic and diplomatic ties with Washington and would have been less interested in helping in Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Similarly, Donald Trump erred at Hanoi in 2019 by listening to its neoconservative advisers. Even if complete North Korean denuclearization was unlikely then (and is a mere pipe dream now), a midway agreement to freeze its number of weapons was within reach. As with Iran, had diplomacy not been abandoned, Pyongyang would probably have far better relations with the United States today. It would be less dependent on Chinese and Russian support to sustain itself.

Pundits likely have a point that China and Russia form an actual entente that coordinates closely to harm Western interests. But lumping together these four widely different states into an imaginary new Axis of Evil and treating them as enemies uniformly is dangerous. Not only does such a misjudgment entail foregoing profitable diplomacy with Pyongyang and Tehran, but by antagonizing the four simultaneously, pundits and policymakers risk transforming a disparate set of relationships into the cohesive axis they fear.