The Latin expression, praecisio mundi, precision of the world, has a long history in Western philosophy, acquired renewed notoriety since Descartes and more in the 19th century with positivism. In this text, I argue that it is acquiring a new and problematic importance. Etymologically, praecisio derives from the Latin verb praecidere which means to cut off, to mutilate, but over time the term acquired a positive meaning: precision: to express oneself briefly, to be clear, to be precise, to leave out the superfluous. In Western modernity, the concept has come to mean the elimination of everything that is considered obscure or confusing, from theological metaphysics to mythical-poetic thought and vernacular, popular communication.

Precision, as an expression of what is rigorous, has come to be identified with everything that is predictable, measurable and quantifiable. For modern science, precision is the raison d'être of scientific work and, with positivism, the concept of precision achieved its maximum legitimacy. According to Auguste Comte, in the first version of his positivist manifesto, published in 1822, it was considered precise and therefore positive: what was real and not imaginary; useful and not idle; certain and not doubtful; not vague, indeterminate or inexact. The epistemic leap occurs when precision is identified with truth. What is imprecise cannot be true. The hegemony of modern science as the only valid knowledge meant that everything that wasn't true (precise) for science was considered disposable, if not dangerous. The problem was never the idea of rigor (which is desirable and necessary), but what was meant by rigor and the criteria that underpinned it1.

Since the beginning (perhaps with Thales of Miletus in the 6th century BC), the concept of precision has been the subject of controversy. From the Sophists to the Romantics, from the debates on quantitative sciences (explanation) and qualitative sciences (understanding), from quantum physics to astronomy, the limitations imposed on the concept of precision, the suspicion of subjectivity that can surreptitiously underlie it and, above all, the importance of what can be amputated by the scissors of precision have been contested. This contestation will reach a level of existential discussion in the near future as artificial intelligence and its privileged instrument, algorithms, become the condition of effective precision in our time. The debate has already begun and will certainly reach its maximum in areas such as complex medical interventions and lethal weapons in theaters of war.

A deeper reflection shows that precision has a validity today that goes far beyond these areas. It is now one of the pillars of the spirit of the age. True to the epistemic perspective I have been adopting, the epistemologies of the South, I am interested in identifying the sociology of absences (in the form of amputations or mutilations) that the concept of precision feeds on. Without any concern for exhaustion, I will briefly discuss two amputations or mutilations. Others will follow. I refer to the Latin designations to show where they come from.

Ancoras praecidere/cutting off the ties

The theme of cutting off the ties is a leitmotif of all Eurocentric modernity and took on the character of an almost categorical imperative with Nietzsche. Cutting off the ties means freeing the modern human being's boat so that he can sail, take risks, venture out and innovate. Literally, cutting off the ties is what Portuguese, Spanish and later other European navigators are said to have done when they set sail in search of the so-called New World. In Gay Science, Nietzsche advocates leaving and cutting off the bridges with everything that has been left behind, namely the entire ontological, metaphysical and theological burden with which Western culture has been constituted. And the fundamental break is with God: God is dead and it was humans who killed him. The nihilistic void will be filled by Zarathustra's superman. Nietzsche's provocation has vanished into thin air, but other avatars of God seem to be on the horizon. Artificial intelligence and algorithms are destined to be the superman of our times. If you ask ChatGTP what God is, you'll be led to the conclusion that belief in God has been replaced by belief in the algorithm.

Cutting off the ties means amputating the epistemic, social and cultural wealth of the world to an unimaginable degree, not only of the non-Western world that was colonized from the 15th century onwards, but of everything that was cut off from Western culture and philosophy because it was not useful to the cause of colonization. The memory and history of those who cannot forget is lost. Unconditional authority is given to those who don't want to remember. And if precision is increasingly conditioned by so-called artificial intelligence, the neo-colonial extractivism on which it is based (the construction of big data and the biases that inhabit all algorithmic construction protected by patents), it is possible that praecisio mundi will tragically end in praecisio mortis mundi (precision of the end of the world).

Linguam praecidere/cutting out the tongue

I'm not referring here to the literal use of cutting out the tongue as a form of punishment for certain crimes in the ancient world. Metaphorically, cutting out the tongue has had multiple meanings, such as forbidding the use of certain words or languages (blasphemy), or demanding the precision of terms as an expression of the precision of thought (philosophy, science) or of the authority of those who pronounce (oracles, fatwas, encyclicals, codes). The search for precision or correctness in language always implies the amputation or mutilation of what is excluded and the exercise of control over what is included. Depending on the type of power on which this control is based, amputation has sometimes been odious, sometimes virtuous. The Inquisition (the burning of books and often their authors) and all the dictatorial political regimes that imposed censorship and forbade dissent were, and continue to be, the most odious forms of language amputation in the name of orthodoxy and dogmatism.

With the advent of modern science, the amputation of language—which Galileo had pioneered by proclaiming the superiority of mathematical and geometric language—became the only way to achieve the virtuous precision of language, identified as the only expression of truth. Positivism took this legitimacy to a paroxysm. The costs of mutilating language in the name of precision were always denounced, both because the criteria of precision were disguises for imprecision (Schopenhauer) and because the mythical-poetic, aesthetic and religious dimensions were relegated to the disposable world of confusion and obscurity, as many philosophers and poets have pointed out.

But these denunciations missed many other forms of mutilation that led to an impoverished understanding of the world. First and foremost, orality became an inherently imprecise and therefore disposable linguistic vehicle. In the peoples colonized by Europeans, oral culture dominated, and continued to dominate for a long time. Precisely because it was oral, it was the target of what I call epistemicide, the destruction of orally transmitted knowledge from generation to generation. The precision of scientific knowledge did not necessarily have to lead to this destruction. It was enough for science to be considered valid knowledge, but not the only valid knowledge. On this basis, it would be possible to critically value different knowledges (their possibilities and limits), recognize the different concepts of rigor, seek dialogues between them in order to increase intercultural interknowledge of the world—what I have called the ecology of knowledges. But that's not what happened.

On the contrary, with positivism the monoculture of science was fully enshrined and scientific precision became the sole criterion of truth. However, since all systems of knowledge are incomplete and cannot answer all questions, science, as the only valid knowledge, became both a system of knowledge and a system of ignorance. Since science can only answer scientifically formulated questions, ignorance lies in questions that cannot be scientifically formulated. Why are we in the world? What is the meaning of life? Do our ancestors live with us? Why, being finite, are human beings the only ones who think about the infinite? Are they? What is the difference between hearing and listening deeply? Between seeing and seeing the invisible? Why does a good poem touch us more deeply than any scientific article? What is spirituality? Is the truth of a mystical experience reduced to the psychological state it manifests?

The mutilation of language in the name of science has brought with it some perversities that deserve attention. I'll list two. Firstly, scientific rigor has created a culture of linguistic patrolling that turns against science itself (and its truth) when it doesn't subscribe to it. Examples of this are the proliferation of fake news, political correctness and the cancel culture. Secondly, the patrolling of scientific correctness by anonymous reviewers (of unknown knowledge and ignorance) and based on quantitative criteria of rankings and impact is destroying scientific curiosity and creativity. Revolutionary science, in Thomas Kuhn's terms, has become unfeasible. For these reasons, scientifically formulated questions are still important, but they are of interest to fewer and fewer people, they are increasingly trivial, guided by interests that escape the scientists themselves and have nothing to do with improving human and non-human life, which was the original aim of science.

References

1 In the 1980s, the existentialist philosopher Wolfgang Janke wrote a short text entitled "Postontologie" in which he presented the first critical analysis of praecisio mundi. This text was published in Spanish on the initiative of Colombian philosopher Guillermo Hoyos Vasquez under the title Mito y Poesia en la crisis en la modernidad/postmodernidad: postontologia. Buenos Aires: La Marca, 1995. Janke returned to the theme in Kritik des präzisierten Welt, 1999 and, finally, in Fragen die uns angehen, 2016. The initiative of Guillermo Hoyos, unjustly forgotten today, was recently recalled by Yuri Jack Gómez-Morales "La praecisio mundi. La medición de la ciencia y el recorte de la universidad como proyecto cultural." Ideas y Valores 70, Supp. no. 7 (2021): 111-121.