The Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) has experienced significant changes since Soviet Russia took control of Georgia in 1921. From periods of intense suppression to remarkable resilience and eventual transformation, these shifts have deeply influenced the church's role and presence in modern Georgia.

Soviet strategies and church repression

The Soviet regime's impact on Georgia's church began with significant changes aimed at aligning the Georgian Church with the Russian model. This included the seizure of church lands and making the clergy financially dependent on the state. These actions were part of a broader strategy to ensure state control over all aspects of society, including religion. The suppression of the Georgian Orthodox Church was not an isolated incident but part of a systematic effort to eradicate religious influence that could challenge Soviet authority.

During the Democratic Republic of Georgia (1918-1921), the Church faced significant challenges. Although it regained some autonomy in 1917, the government marginalized its leadership role. Orthodoxy, previously a dominant ideology, was equated with other religions, and state funding for the church was cut off. This period illustrates the initial phases of diminishing church influence, setting the stage for more aggressive Soviet actions.

With Soviet control in 1921, the separation of church and state was formalized, and an aggressive anti-religious campaign began. Religious celebrations were outlawed, priests were ridiculed, and newspapers were filled with anti-religious propaganda. Despite these efforts, many Georgians continued to practice their faith, highlighting the deep-rooted religious fervour that persisted even under severe repression.

The suppression of the Church during the Soviet period had a paradoxical effect on the faith of ordinary Georgians. On one hand, the state's aggressive promotion of atheism and the persecution of religious practices aimed to weaken the Church's influence. However, this suppression often strengthened the resolve of believers, as Christianity became a symbol of resistance and a marker of national identity. The Church's association with Georgian ethnicity and historical identity provided a powerful counter-narrative to Soviet atheism, leading many Georgians to hold onto their faith more firmly as an act of cultural and national preservation.

At the same time, The financial dependence on the state during the Soviet era significantly altered the internal power dynamics of the Georgian Orthodox Church. This dependence forced the Church to navigate a complex relationship with the state, often adopting strategies to manoeuvre within the constraints imposed by state atheism. The Church had to balance maintaining its spiritual authority while complying with the state's regulations, leading to a form of ecclesiastical economy where local religious authorities gained more power in managing church affairs. This flexibility allowed the Church to survive and adapt, but it also meant that the Church's leadership had to be adept at negotiating with the state to protect its interests and maintain its influence among the faithful.

The anti-religious campaign and societal impact

The Communist Union led efforts to replace religious holidays with state-sanctioned celebrations, such as "Communist Christmas" and "Communist Easter." These militant atheist initiatives initially thrived but eventually waned, becoming state-controlled. By 1922-1923, atheist organizations began forming in Georgia, mirroring similar developments in Russia. These efforts reflect the broader Soviet agenda to replace religious identity with state ideology, fundamentally altering the societal fabric.

In 1927, the GOC faced a critical juncture. Patriarch Christofore Tsitskishvili attempted to demonstrate loyalty to the Soviet regime. Despite previous attempts to appease authorities, he convened the Fourth Church Council in Tiflis, issuing a declaration of allegiance to the government. This declaration starkly contradicted earlier restrictions, claiming the Church now enjoyed full freedom under Soviet rule. This move was a strategic attempt to preserve the church's existence, illustrating the complex negotiation between survival and compromise.

By 1922-1923, circles and cells of "unbelievers" and "atheists" appeared in Georgia. The first official atheist organization "in the form of anti-religious propaganda and agitation" was founded in the city of Voronezh, Russia. In 1923, the "Union of the Godless of Moscow" was formed in Moscow, which united with the new magazine "The Godless Easel" (Silagadze, 2014, 67). In 1924, in the Severdovin region of Russia, the "Atheist" society was formed (Silagadze, 2014, 68). On August 27, 1924, at a meeting in the editorial office of the newspaper "Ughmertos," a charter was adopted, on the basis of which the organization was created: the Union of Fighting Ungodlys, whose chairman was appointed Emil Yaroslavsky (real name: Minei Izrailovich Gubelman), a historian by profession, a member of the party, and an experienced atheist who was at the head of many newspapers (Silagadze, 2014, 68). Earlier in Soviet Georgia, in 1923, the newspaper."

Similar sentiments echoed in Russia, where Metropolitan Sergiy declared the Church's loyalty to the Soviet state. This declaration sparked a fierce backlash, with many accusing Sergiy of betraying the Church. The Russian Orthodox Church Abroad and the clandestine Catacomb Church refused to recognize Sergiy's authority, branding it the "Red Church." This internal schism within the Orthodox community highlights the profound impact of Soviet policies on religious unity and identity.

The fallout was profound. The Russian Orthodox Church Abroad and the clandestine Catacomb Church, emerging within the Gulags, refused to recognize Sergiy's authority, branding it the "Red Church." They prohibited their followers from communion with the official institution, decrying it as built on lies and subservience to atheistic ideology. This division remains entrenched, with anti-Sergiy factions denouncing the ongoing propagation of falsehood within the official church.

This article was written by Lika Kobeshavidze. Lika is a Georgian political writer, analytical journalist and fellow with Young Voices Europe, specialising in EU policy and regional security in Europe. She is currently based in Lund, Sweden, pursuing advanced studies in European Studies.